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Twitter Hacker Is Mixing Bitcoin Loot Using a Wasabi Wallet, Elliptic Says - CoinDesk

Twitter Hacker Is Mixing Bitcoin Loot Using a Wasabi Wallet, Elliptic Says - CoinDesk submitted by nice2yz to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Wasabi Wallet Carrying 22% of Bitcoins After Twitter Hack, says Elliptic

Wasabi Wallet Carrying 22% of Bitcoins After Twitter Hack, says Elliptic submitted by kryptouncle to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says submitted by Deebabitcoinair to cryptocurrencynews [link] [comments]

Wasabi Wallet Carrying 22% of Bitcoins After Twitter Hack, says Elliptic - KOINPOST

Wasabi Wallet Carrying 22% of Bitcoins After Twitter Hack, says Elliptic - KOINPOST submitted by kryptouncle to btc [link] [comments]

Twitter Hacker Is Mixing Bitcoin Loot Using a Wasabi Wallet, Elliptic Says

Twitter Hacker Is Mixing Bitcoin Loot Using a Wasabi Wallet, Elliptic Says submitted by Ranzware to BitNewsLive [link] [comments]

Wasabi Wallet Carrying 22% of Bitcoins After Twitter Hack, says Elliptic - KOINPOST

Wasabi Wallet Carrying 22% of Bitcoins After Twitter Hack, says Elliptic - KOINPOST submitted by kryptouncle to CryptoCurrencyTrading [link] [comments]

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says

submitted by cryptolobe to cryptolobe [link] [comments]

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says submitted by cryptoallbot to cryptoall [link] [comments]

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says submitted by Deebabitcoinair to cryptonewswire [link] [comments]

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says submitted by Deebabitcoinair to u/Deebabitcoinair [link] [comments]

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says

Twitter Hackers Using Wasabi Wallet to Wipe Out Bitcoin Trail, Elliptic Says submitted by Deebabitcoinair to Crypto_Currency_News [link] [comments]

Help to get Bitcoin Elliptic Curve `secp256k1` added to Apple's newly open-sourced Swift-Crypto lib, to make iOS wallets safer and better.

Help to get Bitcoin Elliptic Curve `secp256k1` added to Apple's newly open-sourced Swift-Crypto lib, to make iOS wallets safer and better. submitted by Sajjon to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Help getting Bitcoin/Ethereum Elliptic Curve `secp256k1` added to Apples newly open source Swift-Crypto lib, to make iOS wallets safer and better.

Help getting Bitcoin/Ethereum Elliptic Curve `secp256k1` added to Apples newly open source Swift-Crypto lib, to make iOS wallets safer and better. submitted by Sajjon to CryptoCurrency [link] [comments]

Help getting Bitcoin/Ethereum Elliptic Curve `secp256k1` added to Apples newly open source Swift-Crypto lib, to make iOS wallets safer and better.

Help getting Bitcoin/Ethereum Elliptic Curve `secp256k1` added to Apples newly open source Swift-Crypto lib, to make iOS wallets safer and better. submitted by scgco to GGCrypto [link] [comments]

IBM, MIT and Elliptic release world’s largest labeled dataset of bitcoin transactions to try to identify transactions - we need better privacy tools like CashShuffle in every major BCH wallet!

IBM, MIT and Elliptic release world’s largest labeled dataset of bitcoin transactions to try to identify transactions - we need better privacy tools like CashShuffle in every major BCH wallet! submitted by increaseblocks to btc [link] [comments]

IBM, MIT and Elliptic release world’s largest labeled dataset of bitcoin transactions to try to identify transactions - we need better privacy tools like CashShuffle in every major BCH wallet!

IBM, MIT and Elliptic release world’s largest labeled dataset of bitcoin transactions to try to identify transactions - we need better privacy tools like CashShuffle in every major BCH wallet! submitted by vegasbooty to Cryptoandme [link] [comments]

Bitcoin [BTC]: Hamas using multiple wallets to ensure untraceable fundraising, claims Elliptic research

Bitcoin [BTC]: Hamas using multiple wallets to ensure untraceable fundraising, claims Elliptic research submitted by n4bb to CoinPath [link] [comments]

Does anyone know of this back-door impacts Bitcoin wallets? If The Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator is back-doored, is that a problem?

Does anyone know of this back-door impacts Bitcoin wallets? If The Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator is back-doored, is that a problem? submitted by ZepCoin to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Elliptic claims to have software able to track specific bitcoin wallets

Elliptic claims to have software able to track specific bitcoin wallets submitted by BTCNews to BTCNews [link] [comments]

Elliptic and Gem team on multi-signature bitcoin wallets

Elliptic and Gem team on multi-signature bitcoin wallets submitted by jackie249 to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Elliptic Joins With Gem to Create World’s Most Secured Multi-Sig Bitcoin Wallet

Elliptic Joins With Gem to Create World’s Most Secured Multi-Sig Bitcoin Wallet submitted by BTCNews to BTCNews [link] [comments]

Technical: Taproot: Why Activate?

This is a follow-up on https://old.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/hqzp14/technical_the_path_to_taproot_activation/
Taproot! Everybody wants it!! But... you might ask yourself: sure, everybody else wants it, but why would I, sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, want it? Surely I can be better than everybody else because I swapped XXX fiat for Bitcoin unlike all those nocoiners?
And it is important for you to know the reasons why you, o sovereign Bitcoiner, would want Taproot activated. After all, your nodes (or the nodes your wallets use, which if you are SPV, you hopefully can pester to your wallet vendoimplementor about) need to be upgraded in order for Taproot activation to actually succeed instead of becoming a hot sticky mess.
First, let's consider some principles of Bitcoin.
I'm sure most of us here would agree that the above are very important principles of Bitcoin and that these are principles we would not be willing to remove. If anything, we would want those principles strengthened (especially the last one, financial privacy, which current Bitcoin is only sporadically strong with: you can get privacy, it just requires effort to do so).
So, how does Taproot affect those principles?

Taproot and Your /Coins

Most HODLers probably HODL their coins in singlesig addresses. Sadly, switching to Taproot would do very little for you (it gives a mild discount at spend time, at the cost of a mild increase in fee at receive time (paid by whoever sends to you, so if it's a self-send from a P2PKH or bech32 address, you pay for this); mostly a wash).
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash, so the Taproot output spends 12 bytes more; spending from a P2WPKH requires revealing a 32-byte public key later, which is not needed with Taproot, and Taproot signatures are about 9 bytes smaller than P2WPKH signatures, but the 32 bytes plus 9 bytes is divided by 4 because of the witness discount, so it saves about 11 bytes; mostly a wash, it increases blockweight by about 1 virtual byte, 4 weight for each Taproot-output-input, compared to P2WPKH-output-input).
However, as your HODLings grow in value, you might start wondering if multisignature k-of-n setups might be better for the security of your savings. And it is in multisignature that Taproot starts to give benefits!
Taproot switches to using Schnorr signing scheme. Schnorr makes key aggregation -- constructing a single public key from multiple public keys -- almost as trivial as adding numbers together. "Almost" because it involves some fairly advanced math instead of simple boring number adding, but hey when was the last time you added up your grocery list prices by hand huh?
With current P2SH and P2WSH multisignature schemes, if you have a 2-of-3 setup, then to spend, you need to provide two different signatures from two different public keys. With Taproot, you can create, using special moon math, a single public key that represents your 2-of-3 setup. Then you just put two of your devices together, have them communicate to each other (this can be done airgapped, in theory, by sending QR codes: the software to do this is not even being built yet, but that's because Taproot hasn't activated yet!), and they will make a single signature to authorize any spend from your 2-of-3 address. That's 73 witness bytes -- 18.25 virtual bytes -- of signatures you save!
And if you decide that your current setup with 1-of-1 P2PKH / P2WPKH addresses is just fine as-is: well, that's the whole point of a softfork: backwards-compatibility; you can receive from Taproot users just fine, and once your wallet is updated for Taproot-sending support, you can send to Taproot users just fine as well!
(P2WPKH and P2WSH -- SegWit v0 -- addresses start with bc1q; Taproot -- SegWit v1 --- addresses start with bc1p, in case you wanted to know the difference; in bech32 q is 0, p is 1)
Now how about HODLers who keep all, or some, of their coins on custodial services? Well, any custodial service worth its salt would be doing at least 2-of-3, or probably something even bigger, like 11-of-15. So your custodial service, if it switched to using Taproot internally, could save a lot more (imagine an 11-of-15 getting reduced from 11 signatures to just 1!), which --- we can only hope! --- should translate to lower fees and better customer service from your custodial service!
So I think we can say, very accurately, that the Bitcoin principle --- that YOU are in control of your money --- can only be helped by Taproot (if you are doing multisignature), and, because P2PKH and P2WPKH remain validly-usable addresses in a Taproot future, will not be harmed by Taproot. Its benefit to this principle might be small (it mostly only benefits multisignature users) but since it has no drawbacks with this (i.e. singlesig users can continue to use P2WPKH and P2PKH still) this is still a nice, tidy win!
(even singlesig users get a minor benefit, in that multisig users will now reduce their blockchain space footprint, so that fees can be kept low for everybody; so for example even if you have your single set of private keys engraved on titanium plates sealed in an airtight box stored in a safe buried in a desert protected by angry nomads riding giant sandworms because you're the frickin' Kwisatz Haderach, you still gain some benefit from Taproot)
And here's the important part: if P2PKH/P2WPKH is working perfectly fine with you and you decide to never use Taproot yourself, Taproot will not affect you detrimentally. First do no harm!

Taproot and Your Contracts

No one is an island, no one lives alone. Give and you shall receive. You know: by trading with other people, you can gain expertise in some obscure little necessity of the world (and greatly increase your productivity in that little field), and then trade the products of your expertise for necessities other people have created, all of you thereby gaining gains from trade.
So, contracts, which are basically enforceable agreements that facilitate trading with people who you do not personally know and therefore might not trust.
Let's start with a simple example. You want to buy some gewgaws from somebody. But you don't know them personally. The seller wants the money, you want their gewgaws, but because of the lack of trust (you don't know them!! what if they're scammers??) neither of you can benefit from gains from trade.
However, suppose both of you know of some entity that both of you trust. That entity can act as a trusted escrow. The entity provides you security: this enables the trade, allowing both of you to get gains from trade.
In Bitcoin-land, this can be implemented as a 2-of-3 multisignature. The three signatories in the multisgnature would be you, the gewgaw seller, and the escrow. You put the payment for the gewgaws into this 2-of-3 multisignature address.
Now, suppose it turns out neither of you are scammers (whaaaat!). You receive the gewgaws just fine and you're willing to pay up for them. Then you and the gewgaw seller just sign a transaction --- you and the gewgaw seller are 2, sufficient to trigger the 2-of-3 --- that spends from the 2-of-3 address to a singlesig the gewgaw seller wants (or whatever address the gewgaw seller wants).
But suppose some problem arises. The seller gave you gawgews instead of gewgaws. Or you decided to keep the gewgaws but not sign the transaction to release the funds to the seller. In either case, the escrow is notified, and if it can sign with you to refund the funds back to you (if the seller was a scammer) or it can sign with the seller to forward the funds to the seller (if you were a scammer).
Taproot helps with this: like mentioned above, it allows multisignature setups to produce only one signature, reducing blockchain space usage, and thus making contracts --- which require multiple people, by definition, you don't make contracts with yourself --- is made cheaper (which we hope enables more of these setups to happen for more gains from trade for everyone, also, moon and lambos).
(technology-wise, it's easier to make an n-of-n than a k-of-n, making a k-of-n would require a complex setup involving a long ritual with many communication rounds between the n participants, but an n-of-n can be done trivially with some moon math. You can, however, make what is effectively a 2-of-3 by using a three-branch SCRIPT: either 2-of-2 of you and seller, OR 2-of-2 of you and escrow, OR 2-of-2 of escrow and seller. Fortunately, Taproot adds a facility to embed a SCRIPT inside a public key, so you can have a 2-of-2 Taprooted address (between you and seller) with a SCRIPT branch that can instead be spent with 2-of-2 (you + escrow) OR 2-of-2 (seller + escrow), which implements the three-branched SCRIPT above. If neither of you are scammers (hopefully the common case) then you both sign using your keys and never have to contact the escrow, since you are just using the escrow public key without coordinating with them (because n-of-n is trivial but k-of-n requires setup with communication rounds), so in the "best case" where both of you are honest traders, you also get a privacy boost, in that the escrow never learns you have been trading on gewgaws, I mean ewww, gawgews are much better than gewgaws and therefore I now judge you for being a gewgaw enthusiast, you filthy gewgawer).

Taproot and Your Contracts, Part 2: Cryptographic Boogaloo

Now suppose you want to buy some data instead of things. For example, maybe you have some closed-source software in trial mode installed, and want to pay the developer for the full version. You want to pay for an activation code.
This can be done, today, by using an HTLC. The developer tells you the hash of the activation code. You pay to an HTLC, paying out to the developer if it reveals the preimage (the activation code), or refunding the money back to you after a pre-agreed timeout. If the developer claims the funds, it has to reveal the preimage, which is the activation code, and you can now activate your software. If the developer does not claim the funds by the timeout, you get refunded.
And you can do that, with HTLCs, today.
Of course, HTLCs do have problems:
Fortunately, with Schnorr (which is enabled by Taproot), we can now use the Scriptless Script constuction by Andrew Poelstra. This Scriptless Script allows a new construction, the PTLC or Pointlocked Timelocked Contract. Instead of hashes and preimages, just replace "hash" with "point" and "preimage" with "scalar".
Or as you might know them: "point" is really "public key" and "scalar" is really a "private key". What a PTLC does is that, given a particular public key, the pointlocked branch can be spent only if the spender reveals the private key of the given public key to you.
Another nice thing with PTLCs is that they are deniable. What appears onchain is just a single 2-of-2 signature between you and the developemanufacturer. It's like a magic trick. This signature has no special watermarks, it's a perfectly normal signature (the pledge). However, from this signature, plus some datta given to you by the developemanufacturer (known as the adaptor signature) you can derive the private key of a particular public key you both agree on (the turn). Anyone scraping the blockchain will just see signatures that look just like every other signature, and as long as nobody manages to hack you and get a copy of the adaptor signature or the private key, they cannot get the private key behind the public key (point) that the pointlocked branch needs (the prestige).
(Just to be clear, the public key you are getting the private key from, is distinct from the public key that the developemanufacturer will use for its funds. The activation key is different from the developer's onchain Bitcoin key, and it is the activation key whose private key you will be learning, not the developer's/manufacturer's onchain Bitcoin key).
So:
Taproot lets PTLCs exist onchain because they enable Schnorr, which is a requirement of PTLCs / Scriptless Script.
(technology-wise, take note that Scriptless Script works only for the "pointlocked" branch of the contract; you need normal Script, or a pre-signed nLockTimed transaction, for the "timelocked" branch. Since Taproot can embed a script, you can have the Taproot pubkey be a 2-of-2 to implement the Scriptless Script "pointlocked" branch, then have a hidden script that lets you recover the funds with an OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY after the timeout if the seller does not claim the funds.)

Quantum Quibbles!

Now if you were really paying attention, you might have noticed this parenthetical:
(technical details: a Taproot output is 1 version byte + 32 byte public key, while a P2WPKH (bech32 singlesig) output is 1 version byte + 20 byte public key hash...)
So wait, Taproot uses raw 32-byte public keys, and not public key hashes? Isn't that more quantum-vulnerable??
Well, in theory yes. In practice, they probably are not.
It's not that hashes can be broken by quantum computes --- they're still not. Instead, you have to look at how you spend from a P2WPKH/P2PKH pay-to-public-key-hash.
When you spend from a P2PKH / P2WPKH, you have to reveal the public key. Then Bitcoin hashes it and checks if this matches with the public-key-hash, and only then actually validates the signature for that public key.
So an unconfirmed transaction, floating in the mempools of nodes globally, will show, in plain sight for everyone to see, your public key.
(public keys should be public, that's why they're called public keys, LOL)
And if quantum computers are fast enough to be of concern, then they are probably fast enough that, in the several minutes to several hours from broadcast to confirmation, they have already cracked the public key that is openly broadcast with your transaction. The owner of the quantum computer can now replace your unconfirmed transaction with one that pays the funds to itself. Even if you did not opt-in RBF, miners are still incentivized to support RBF on RBF-disabled transactions.
So the extra hash is not as significant a protection against quantum computers as you might think. Instead, the extra hash-and-compare needed is just extra validation effort.
Further, if you have ever, in the past, spent from the address, then there exists already a transaction indelibly stored on the blockchain, openly displaying the public key from which quantum computers can derive the private key. So those are still vulnerable to quantum computers.
For the most part, the cryptographers behind Taproot (and Bitcoin Core) are of the opinion that quantum computers capable of cracking Bitcoin pubkeys are unlikely to appear within a decade or two.
So:
For now, the homomorphic and linear properties of elliptic curve cryptography provide a lot of benefits --- particularly the linearity property is what enables Scriptless Script and simple multisignature (i.e. multisignatures that are just 1 signature onchain). So it might be a good idea to take advantage of them now while we are still fairly safe against quantum computers. It seems likely that quantum-safe signature schemes are nonlinear (thus losing these advantages).

Summary

I Wanna Be The Taprooter!

So, do you want to help activate Taproot? Here's what you, mister sovereign Bitcoin HODLer, can do!

But I Hate Taproot!!

That's fine!

Discussions About Taproot Activation

submitted by almkglor to Bitcoin [link] [comments]

Keys, addresses, and ECC - Breaking Down Bitcoin Ep. 3 Free bitcoin 2019 bitminer ยังจ่ายอยู่ Wallet Balance Check CRI - YouTube Bitcoin Value Death Spiral

The Bitcoin Big Bang. This visualisation shows the emergence over time of the largest entities on the Bitcoin blockchain, and their interconnectivity. We have anonymised most active businesses and private individuals in order to protect their identities. The distance from the centre represents the first appearance of each entity, with Satoshi Nakomoto in the middle, depicting the genesis of ... ELLIPAL Titan cold wallet is the world's first fully air-gapped offline hardware wallet with cryptocurrency app support. it is the best crypto wallet for cold storage Bitcoin(BTC), Ethereum(ETH), XRP, BCH, BSV, USDT, LTC, EOS, BNB, TRX, DASH, XLM, ADA, ETC, VET, ZEC and many more cryptos. ONLY $139/unit for ELLIPAL Titan now! *On sale order-Ship right away* The Cold Wallet, Not Just a Hardware ... Wallet Address: way to identify the owner of a wallet that we can share with others to send and receive bitcoin. This is held on the blockchain, but it is not traceable back to you — hence ... In a story being followed by Bitcoin News, further developments in Hamas attempts to raise fund via Bitcoin have resulted in the mechanism for receiving payments being changed.. Hamas have now switched to a system which requires a new digital wallet generated for each donation rather than donors sending Bitcoin to a single digital address, or wallet, in an attempt to cover their tracks. Here are some ways that a bitcoin address or wallet may be vulnerable. A private key is created with a common password such as “123456”.A simple copy/paste mistake. A transaction is created with non-standard outputs.A random number generator was used wrong or produced the same output.The private key was posted publicly. We are going to be talking about a transaction with a broken random ...

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Keys, addresses, and ECC - Breaking Down Bitcoin Ep. 3

Congress can and should reflect the will of the people. Our research strives to achieve this goal by focusing on the institutional design of legislatures. Es... Episode 3 covers Mastering Bitcoin Chapter 4 - Keys and Addresses. We mainly go over Elliptic Curve Cryptography and the how and why it is used to generate Bitcoin keys and address. Bitcoin Wallet Hack! A program that searches for the private key of a bitcoin! Best method ... Math Behind Bitcoin and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (Explained Simply) - Duration: 11:13. Aimstone ... bitcoin ขุด, bitcoin ข่าว, bitcoin ถอนเงิน, bitcoin ฟรี 2016, bitcoin มือถือ, bitcoin ลงทุน, ลุงโฉลก bitcoin, bitcoin ... How To Use A Bitcoin Hardware Wallet: Ledger Nano X - Duration: 39:02. BTC Sessions Recommended for you. 39:02. ... Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA Teil 10 Kryptographie ...

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